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We present a new technique for proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
cols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent
entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class
of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full
security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and
upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and
which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the BB84, the six-
state, and the B92 protocol with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly,
the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement
data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust
against noise in the quantum channel.
PACS numbers: 89.70.+c,03.67.Dd,03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical key distribution schemes can only be se-
cure under strong assumptions, e.g., that the computing
power or the storage capacity of a potential adversary is
limited. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) al-
lows for provable security under the sole assumption that
the laws of physics are correct. This ultimate security is
certainly one of the main reasons why so much theoret-
ical and experimental effort is undertaken to investigate
QKD protocols and, in particular, to make them practi-
cal [1, 2, 3].
One of the most challenging theoretical problems in the
context of QKD is to determine sufficient and/or neces-
sary conditions for the security of QKD protocols. This
is exactly what we are concerned with in this paper. To
be more precise, we investigate the security of a general
class of QKD schemes which includes the most popular
ones such as the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 pro-
tocol [4, 5, 6]. Our results hold with respect to a model
where two legitimate parties, traditionally called Alice
and Bob, are connected by a quantum channel as well as
an authentic, but otherwise fully insecure, classical chan-
nel [28]. We assume that Alice’s source as well as Bob’s
detector are perfect, whereas an adversary (Eve) might
have full control over the quantum channel [29]
QKD protocols can usually be divided into a quantum
and a classical part: In the quantum part, the transmit-
ter (Alice) sends qubits (or more generally, some d-level
physical systems) prepared in certain states to the re-
ceiver (Bob). The states of these qubits are encodings
of bit values randomly chosen by Alice. Bob performs a
measurement on the qubits to decode the bit values. For
each of the bits, both the encoding and the decoding are
chosen at random from a certain set of operators. Af-
ter the transmission step, Alice and Bob apply a sifting
where they publicly compare the encoding and decoding
operator they have used and keep only the bit pairs for
which these operators match.
Once Alice and Bob have correlated bitstrings, they
proceed with the classical part of the protocol. In a
first step, called parameter-estimation, they compare the
bit-values for a randomly chosen sample of their strings,
which gives an estimate for the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), i.e., the fraction of positions where Alice and
Bob’s strings differ. Note that the QBER is a direct
measure for the secrecy of Alice and Bob’s strings, since
any eavesdropping strategy would, according to the laws
of quantum mechanics (no-cloning theorem) perturb the
correlations between them [30]. If the QBER is too high,
Alice and Bob decide to abort the protocol. Otherwise,
they apply a classical (post)-processing protocol to dis-
till a secret key, using either one-way or two-way classi-
cal communication. One-way post-processing protocols
usually consist of error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation [31]. For the error correction, Alice sends certain
information to Bob such that he can reconstruct Alice’s
string. Once Alice and Bob have identical strings, pri-
vacy amplification is used to compute a final key on which
the adversary has virtually no information. We shall see
that the performance of such one-way protocols can gen-
erally be increased if Alice additionally applies some pre-
processing to her initial string before starting with the
error correction.
Any realistic quantum channel is subject to noise.
Consequently, even in the absence of an adversary Eve,
the QBER is non-zero. On the other hand, Eve might in
principle replace the real (noisy) quantum channel with
an ideal noise-free channel and could thus tap mildly into
the quantum communication such as to introduce pre-
cisely the original amount of noise. Hence, when proving
the security of a protocol, one has to assume that all the
noise is due to Eve. This raises the following question:
What is the maximum QBER, i.e., the maximum toler-
ated channel noise, such that Alice and Bob can still gen-
erate a secure key? Clearly, the answer to this question
depends on the amount of information that Eve might
have gained by her attack.
2Ideally, one does not want to impose any restriction
on Eve’s power. That is, any strategy allowed by the
laws of physics has to be considered. On the other hand,
the set of all possible attacks is usually difficult to han-
dle. In order to cope with these conflicting objectives,
three classes of attacks have been considered. The small-
est class only contains the so-called individual attacks,
where Eve is restricted to interacting with each of the
signal systems sent by Alice separately. That is, for each
of the signal systems, Eve attaches an auxiliary system
and applies some fixed unitary operation. Finally, Eve
measures each of these systems individually right after
the sifting step, i.e., before Alice and Bob start with the
classical processing. The class of collective attacks is de-
fined similarly, but the last requirement is dropped. That
is, Eve might wait with her measurement until the very
end of the protocol. In particular, the measurement she
chooses might depend on the messages Alice and Bob
exchange for error correction and privacy amplification.
Moreover, she might measure all her auxiliary systems
jointly. Not much is known about this class, and research
has more concentrated on the class of coherent attacks,
which is the most general one. In particular, Eve might
let all the signal systems interact with one large auxiliary
system, which she only measures at the very end of the
protocol.
Many [32] of the previous security proofs of QKD pro-
tocols are based on the following observations [8, 9, 10,
11]:
1. Instead of preparing a system in a certain state and
then sending it to Bob, Alice can equivalently pre-
pare an entangled state, send one of the qubits to
Bob, and later measure her subsystem. In doing so,
she effectively prepares Bob’s system at a distance.
2. If the joint system of Alice and Bob is in a pure
state, then it cannot be entangled with any third
party; in particular it cannot be entangled with
any of Eve’s auxiliary systems. Hence, simple mea-
surements provide Alice and Bob with data totally
oblivious to Eve.
3. If furthermore the state shared by Alice and Bob
is maximally entangled, then their measurement
results are maximally correlated. Hence, if Alice
and Bob performed some entanglement purification
protocol [12, 13], they would end up with the de-
sired secret bits.
4. Since one is interested in the security of protocols
implemented with nowadays technology, Alice and
Bob’s operations should not require the storage of
quantum states, i.e., one does not want them to run
a general entanglement distillation protocol. To
overcome this problem, one uses the fact that cer-
tain entanglement distillation protocols are math-
ematically equivalent to quantum error correction
codes. There exists a class of such codes, called
CSS codes, which have the property that bit errors
and phase errors can be corrected separately. Since
the final key is classical, its value does not depend
on the phase errors. Hence, Alice and Bob actu-
ally only have to correct the bit-errors, which is a
purely classical task.
This method for proving the security of QKD protocols
is very elegant, but raises two different questions. First,
is the detour via entanglement purification really neces-
sary? Is it optimal? Or might other methods lead to
better results? Secondly, must all cryptographers learn
the intricate theory of entanglement? Is there an expla-
nation of the results within the language of information
theory? As we shall see, the theory of entanglement pu-
rification, as explained above, is not necessary and also
too pessimistic (from Alice and Bob’s point of view).
In fact, we present a technique for proving the security
of QKD protocols which does not rely on entanglement
purification. Instead, it is based on information-theoretic
results on the security of privacy amplification [14, 15],
which have first been applied in [16] to analyze the se-
curity of a generic QKD protocol similar to the one we
are considering here [33] (see also [17] for a similar ap-
proach). Since secret key agreement might be possible
even if the initial quantum state, the state Alice and
Bob share before error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion, does not allow for entanglement purification, our
method generally leads to more optimistic results than
any method based on entanglement purification. In ad-
dition, we show that the final key is secure according to a
so-called universally composable security definition. This
implies that the key can safely be used in any arbitrary
context. Remarkably, this is not the case for most of the
known security definitions (cf. discussion in [15]).
One interesting example illustrating the strength of our
technique is the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol,
where, in the classical processing step, Alice additionally
adds some (large) amount of noise to her measurement
data. We show that, surprisingly, this noise generally
increases the rate at which Alice and Bob can generate
secret key bits. However, the density operator of Alice
and Bob’s system after the noise has been introduced is
not entangled, i.e., any security proof based on entangle-
ment purification fails.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
describe and analyze a generic QKD protocol using one-
way classical post-processing. According to the discus-
sion above, the protocol is subdivided into a quantum
and a classical part. In Section IIA, which is devoted to
the quantum part, we review our result presented in [18].
It states that the density operator describing Alice and
Bob’s information after the quantum communication can
be considered to be a symmetric (with respect to permu-
tations of the qubit pairs) Bell-diagonal state. The clas-
sical part of the protocol is then studied in Section II B.
Using some recent results of classical and quantum infor-
mation theory [15, 19], we analyze the performance of the
classical post-processing. In Section III, we combine the
main statements of Sections IIA and II B and derive an
3expression for the secret-key rate which only involves a
minimization over a certain set of two-qubit states which
correspond to collective attacks. In Section IV, we give
an upper bound on the secret-key rate for any protocol
with one-way classical post-processing, again involving
only two-qubit density operators. Finally, in Section V,
we apply our methods to the BB84, the six-state, and
the B92 protocol. In addition, we show that the effi-
ciency of each of these protocols can be increased if one
of the parties adds noise to her measurement data.
II. A GENERAL QKD PROTOCOL USING
ONE-WAY COMMUNICATION
In this section, we describe a general class of QKD pro-
tocols employing one-way classical post-processing. This
class contains the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 proto-
col [4, 5, 6], among many others. Each of these protocols
consists of a quantum and a classical part: The quan-
tum part includes the distribution and measurement of
quantum information, and is determined by the operators
Alice and Bob use for their encoding and decoding. Sec-
tion IIA is devoted to the analysis of this part. Generally
speaking, we review our result proven in [18] which states
that the density operator describing Alice and Bob’s sys-
tem after the distribution of quantum information can be
assumed to be symmetric (cf. equation (1)). Section II B
deals with the classical part of the QKD protocol, i.e., pa-
rameter estimation and post-processing. We first give a
description of a post-processing scheme and then derive
an expression for the maximum length of the key that
this scheme can generate, depending on the information
that Alice and Bob share after the quantum part of the
QKD protocol.
To simplify the presentation of our results, we assume
that the physical systems which Alice sends to Bob are
qubits. However, a generalization to higher dimensions is
straightforward. Throughout the paper, we use the fol-
lowing notation: Vectors (l1, . . . ln) are denoted by bold
letters l. We use capital letters as subscripts for density
operators, e.g., σAB , to denote the subsystems they act
on. A bold letter indicates that the corresponding sub-
system is itself a product of many (identical) systems.
Furthermore, for any state |Φ〉, P|Φ〉 = |Φ〉 〈Φ| is the pro-
jector onto |Φ〉.
A. Quantum part: Distribution of quantum
information and measurement
The quantum part of a QKD protocol is specified by
the encoding and decoding operations employed by Alice
and Bob. For the following, we assume that Alice uses
m different encodings, with index j ∈ J := {1, . . . ,m}.
For each j ∈ J ,
∣∣φ0j〉 and ∣∣φ1j〉 denote the states used to
encode the bit values 0 and 1, respectively.
In the first step of the protocol, Alice randomly
chooses n bits x1, . . . , xn and sends n qubits prepared
in the states
∣∣φx1j1 〉 , . . . , ∣∣φxnjn 〉 to Bob, for randomly cho-
sen encodings j1, . . . , jn. Upon receiving these states
(which might have undergone some perturbation, pos-
sibly caused by an attack) Bob applies his measurements
to obtain classical bits (y1, . . . , yn). Finally, Alice and
Bob employ a sifting sub-protocol, where they only keep
the qubit pairs for which the encoding and the measure-
ment operation that they have applied are compatible.
As demonstrated in [18], this protocol can equiva-
lently be described as a so-called entanglement-based
scheme [20]. For this purpose, we define the encoding
operators Aj := |0〉
〈
(φ0j )
∗∣∣ + |1〉 〈(φ1j )∗∣∣ and the decod-
ing operators Bj = |0〉
〈
φ1j
∣∣⊥+ |1〉 〈φ0j ∣∣⊥, where {|0〉 , |1〉}
is some orthonormal basis, in the following called z-basis.
For x = 0, 1 and j ∈ J , |0〉 〈(φ0j )∗∣∣ denotes the complex
conjugate of
∣∣φxj 〉 in the z-basis, and ∣∣φxj 〉⊥ is some (not
necessarily normalized) state orthogonal to
∣∣φxj 〉.
For the entanglement-based scheme, Alice simply pre-
pares n two-qubit systems in the state Aji⊗1l |Φ+〉, where
|Φ+〉 = 1/√2(|0, 0〉+ |1, 1〉), and sends the second qubit
to Bob. Then, Bob randomly applies one of the opera-
tors Bj to the qubit he receives. Finally, Alice and Bob
measure their systems and associate to the outcome the
bit values 0 or 1.
The description of a QKD protocol as an entangle-
ment-based scheme is very convenient for the security
analysis. In particular, instead of considering the quan-
tum communication between Alice and Bob, it suffices to
have a characterization of the quantum state ρ˜nAB held
by Alice and Bob before they apply their measurements.
Consider now a slight extension of the protocol where
Alice and Bob randomly permute the positions of the
measured bit pairs and, additionally, at each position, flip
the values of both bits with probability one half. In the
entanglement based version of the protocol, these (purely
classical) operations can equivalently be applied to the
initial quantum state ρ˜nAB of Alice and Bob. For the
following, we restrict our attention to the partial state
ρ˜ndataAB containing only the ndata particle pairs which are
later used for the computation of the final key (but not
for parameter estimation) and which are measured with
respect to the z-basis [34]. (To keep the notation simple,
we write in the following n instead of ndata.) The com-
mon bit-flip is then described by the quantum operation
σx ⊗ σx. Moreover, we can assume that Alice and Bob
apply random phase flips σz ⊗ σz to their qubit pairs,
since these do not change the distribution of the classi-
cal measurement outcomes. The resulting state ρnAB of
Alice and Bob is thus given by ρnAB = D⊗n2 (Pn(ρ˜nAB))
where the operator Pn denotes the completely positive
map (CPM) which symmetrizes the state with respect to
permutations of the n qubit pairs, and where the CPM
D2 describes the operation where both σx⊗σx and σz⊗σz
are applied with probability 12 . This is equivalent to the
random application of any of the operators 1l⊗1l, σx⊗σx,
σy ⊗ σy, or σz ⊗ σz , i.e., D2 can be interpreted as the
4action of a depolarizing channel transforming any two-
qubit state to a Bell-diagonal state. Consequently, as
shown in [18], ρnAB has the simple form
ρnAB =
n∑
n1,n2,n3,n4
µn1,n2,n3,n4ρn1,n2,n3,n4 . (1)
In this formula, the sum is taken over all n1, n2, n3, n4 ∈
N0 satisfying n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = n and µn1,n2,n3,n4 are
some (real-valued) non-negative coefficients. Moreover,
ρn1,n2,n3,n4 is the state of n qubit pairs defined by
ρn1,n2,n3,n4 := Pn
(
P⊗n1|Φ1〉 ⊗ P
⊗n2
|Φ2〉 ⊗ P
⊗n3
|Φ3〉 ⊗ P
⊗n4
|Φ4〉
)
, (2)
where P|Φ1〉 := P|Φ+〉, P|Φ2〉 := P|Φ−〉, P|Φ3〉 := P|Ψ+〉,
and P|Φ4〉 := P|Ψ−〉 are projectors onto the Bell states
|Φ±〉 = 1/√2 |0, 0〉±|1, 1〉 and |Ψ±〉 = 1/√2 |0, 1〉±|1, 0〉).
Note that the state (1) is, independently of the protocol,
separable with respect to the different qubit pairs.
To prove the security of our protocol, we will assume
that Eve has the purification of the state (1), which
clearly includes all the information she possibly can get.
It is explained in [18] that, if the encoding operators Aj
are unitary, then this assumption is also tight, i.e., there
actually exists an attack which provides Eve with this
purification.
Formula (1) is already sufficient to prove our main re-
sults (see Section III). However, to simplify the analysis
of certain protocols, it is often convenient to consider the
additional symmetrization (see [18]) given by the CPM
D1 defined by
D1(ρ) = 1/N
∑
j
pjAj ⊗Bj(ρ)A†j ⊗B†j . (3)
Here pj ≥ 0 denotes the probability by which Alice and
Bob decide (during the sifting phase) to keep their bits,
if they have applied the operation Aj ⊗ Bj , and N is
used for the normalization. All classical data of Al-
ice and Bob (including the bits used for parameter es-
timation) are then given by a measurement of the state
D2(⊗n(D⊗n1 )(Pn(ρ˜nAB))) with respect to the z-basis.
B. Classical part: Parameter estimation and
classical post-processing
This section is devoted to the description and analy-
sis of the classical part of the QKD protocol. We will
use here techniques which partly have been developed
in [16]. Assume that Alice and Bob already hold strings
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), respectively,
which they have obtained by measuring n particle pairs
ρnAB distributed in the first part of the QKD protocol,
as described in Section IIA. Their goal is to generate a
secure key pair (SA,SB), using X and Y.
The protocol we consider consists of two sub-proto-
cols, called parameter estimation and classical (post)-
processing. The main purpose of the parameter estima-
tion sub-protocol is to estimate the amount of errors that
have occurred during the distribution of the quantum in-
formation (see Section IIA). To do this, Alice and Bob
compare the measurement outcomes for some randomly
chosen qubit pairs. If the quantum bit error rate is above
a certain threshold QBER, they decide to abort the pro-
tocol.
In order to analyze a given QKD protocol, we need to
characterize the initial states ρnAB for which the protocol
does not abort. Clearly, this characterization depends
on the threshold QBER. Let Γ be the set of all two-
qubit states σAB which correspond to a collective attack,
meaning that there exists an operation of Eve such that
ρnAB = σ
⊗n
AB . The set ΓQBER is then defined as the sub-
set of Γ containing all states σAB for which the protocol
does not abort (with probability almost one). In other
words, if σAB ∈ ΓQBER, then the protocol is supposed
to compute a secret key when starting with ρnAB = σ
⊗n
AB.
We will see in Section III that the characterization of the
set ΓQBER is sufficient to compute lower bounds on the
secret-key rate.
After the parameter estimation, if the estimate for the
QBER is below the threshold, Alice and Bob proceed
with a classical sub-protocol in order to turn their only
partially secure strings X and Y into a highly secure
key pair (SA,SB). The protocol we consider is one-way,
i.e., only communication from Alice to Bob is needed. It
consists of three steps:
I) Pre-processing: Using her bit string X, Alice com-
putes two stringsU andV, according to some chan-
nels U ← X and V ← U, defined by conditional
probability distributions PU|X and PV|U, respec-
tively. She keeps U and sends V to Bob. (We
will see that, for most protocols, the performance
highly depends on a clever choice ofU, whereas the
string V is usually not needed.)
II) Information reconciliation: Alice sends error cor-
rection information W on U to Bob. Using Y, V,
and W, Bob computes a guess Uˆ for U.
III) Privacy amplification: Alice randomly chooses a
function F from a family of two-universal hash
functions [35] and sends a description of F to
Bob. Then Alice and Bob compute their keys,
SA = F (U) and SB = F (Uˆ), respectively.
Before starting with the analysis of this protocol, let
us introduce some notation. It is most convenient to
describe the classical information of Alice and Bob as
well as the quantum information of the adversary Eve by
a tripartite density operator ρXYE of the form
ρnXYE =
∑
x,y
PXY(x,y)P|x〉 ⊗ P|y〉 ⊗ ρx,yE (4)
where {|x〉}x and {|y〉}y are families of orthonormal vec-
tors and where ρx,yE is the quantum state of Eve given
that Alice and Bob’s random variables X and Y take
the values x and y, respectively. Similarly, the classical
5key pair (SA,SB) together with the adversary’s informa-
tion ρsA,sBE′ after the protocol execution is described by a
quantum state ρSASBE′ . We say that (SA,SB) is ε-secure
(with respect to ρE′) if
δ
(
ρSASBE′ ,
∑
s∈S
PS(s)P|s〉 ⊗ P|s〉 ⊗ ρE′
) ≤ ε (5)
where PS is the uniform distribution over all possible keys
s and where δ(·, ·) denotes the trace-distance. This im-
plies that the state ρSASBE′ describing the key of Alice
and Bob together with the adversary’s quantum system
is close to a state where the adversary’s system is com-
pletely independent of the key.
The goal of the remaining part of this section is to de-
rive an expression for the number ℓn of ε-secure key bits
that can be generated by the above protocol, for an opti-
mal choice of the protocol parameters. For this purpose,
we first consider some fixed pre-processing, specified by
the channels U← X and V ← U, for which we compute
the maximum key length ℓnU←X,V←U. The quantity ℓ
n is
then obtained by optimizing over all choices of the pre-
processing.
Our result is formulated in terms of an information-
theoretic quantity, called smooth Re´nyi entropy [19] (see
Appendix A for more details). Similarly to the Shan-
non entropy H(X), the smooth Re´nyi entropy of a ran-
dom variable X , denoted by Hεα(X), is a measure for
the uncertainty about the value of X . We will also need
an extension of this entropy measure to quantum states.
Similarly to the von Neumann entropy S(ρ), the smooth
Re´nyi entropy Sεα(ρ) of a state ρ quantifies the amount
of randomness contained in ρ.
The main ingredient needed for the following deriva-
tion is a recent result on the security of privacy amplifi-
cation [15] (see Lemma C.2). Generally speaking, it says
that the length of the key that can be extracted from a
string U held by both Alice and Bob is given by the un-
certainty of the adversary about U, measured in terms
of smooth Re´nyi entropies. Applied to the last step of
our protocol, we get
ℓnU←X,V←U ≈ Sε2(ρnUVWE)− Sε0(ρnVWE) , (6)
where ε depends on the desired security of the final key
and where the approximation “≈” means that equal-
ity holds up to some small additive term of the order
O(log(1/ε)). In this formula, ρnUVWE is the density op-
erator describing the stringsU, V, andW, together with
the adversary’s knowledge, i.e.,
ρnUVWE
=
∑
x,y,u,v,w
PXYUVW(x,y,u,v,w)P|u〉⊗P|v〉⊗P|w〉⊗ρx,yE
where {|u〉}u, {|v〉}v, and {|w〉}w are families of or-
thonormal vectors. Note that, since the channel con-
necting Alice and Bob might be arbitrarily insecure, the
key must be secure even if the adversary knows V and
W.
In the next step, we will eliminate the dependence on
W in (6). For this, we consider the amount m of (use-
ful) information contained in W. Since W is needed by
Bob in order to guess U, m depends on his uncertainty
about U. In fact, if an optimal error correction code
is applied, then m is roughly equal to the entropy of U
conditioned on Bob’s information Y and V. More pre-
cisely, using Lemma C.3 described in Appendix C, we
have m ≈ Hε0(U|YV). Hence, when omitting W on
the right hand side of (6), the smooth Re´nyi entropies
cannot decrease by more than m (see Appendix A for
a summary of the properties of smooth Re´nyi entropy).
We thus immediately obtain
ℓnU←X,V←U ≈ Sε2(ρnUVE)−Sε0(ρnVE)−Hε0(U|VY) . (7)
Since the channels U← X and V← U applied by Al-
ice in the first step of the classical post-processing proto-
col are arbitrary, we can optimize over all choices of such
channels. We thus conclude that the number ℓn of key
bits that can be generated by the described protocol, for
an optimal choice of all the parameters, is given by
ℓn ≈ sup
U←X
V←U
Sε2(ρ
n
UVE)− Sε0(ρnVE)−Hε0(U|VY) . (8)
In the following, we will often consider protocols where
the strings U and V are computed bit-wise from the
string X. The maximum length of the secret key that
can be generated by such a protocol is then given by an
expression similar to (8), but where the supremum is only
taken over bit-wise channels U ← X and V ← U .
III. A LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRET-KEY
RATE
The goal of this section is to derive a lower bound for
the secret-key rate which only involves two-qubit states
and which is thus easy to compute. For this purpose,
we use the general expression (8) of Section II B for the
number of key bits that can be generated from a given
state, together with the fact that, after symmetrization,
any state of Alice and Bob has the simple form (1).
Let us start with a description of our main result.
Consider the QKD protocol described in Section II,
where we assume that Alice uses bit-wise channels U ←
X and V ← U to compute U = (U1, . . . , Un) and
V = (V1, . . . , Vn), respectively, from her data X =
(X1, . . . , Xn). Let ΓQBER be the set of two-qubit density
operators σAB defined in Section II B, i.e., the protocol
aborts (with high probability) whenever it starts with a
product state (σAB)
⊗n for any σAB /∈ ΓQBER. We show
that, for an optimal choice of the parameters, the proto-
col of the previous section, generates secret key bits at
rate r := limn→∞ ℓ
n
n where
r ≥ sup
U←X
V←U
inf
σAB∈ΓQBER
(
S(U |V E)−H(U |Y V )) . (9)
6In this formula, S(U |V E) denotes the von Neumann en-
tropy of U conditioned on V and Eve’s initial informa-
tion, i.e., S(U |V E) := S(σUV E) − S(σV E). The state
σUV E is obtained from σAB by taking a purification
σABE of the Bell diagonal state σ
diag
AB := D2(σAB) [36]
and applying the measurement of Alice followed by the
classical channels U ← X and V ← U . Similarly, Y is
the outcome of Bob’s measurement applied to the second
subsystem of σABE .
As (9) involves a minimization over the set ΓQBER of
two-qubit states, our lower bound on the secret-key rate
only depends on the set of possible collective attacks. On
the other hand, the security we prove holds against any
arbitrary coherent attack. Note also that the statement
extends to the situation where Alice—instead of applying
a bit-wise pre-processing on each of the n bits—uses some
operation involving larger blocks, say of length m. In
this case, one has to consider all attacks U⊗r where the
adversary applies the same operation U on each of the
r = mn blocks.
A crucial task when computing explicit values for (9)
is to characterize the set ΓQBER, This set is determined
by the conditions under which the protocol aborts. In
Section V, we will demonstrate how formula (9) is com-
puted for concrete QKD schemes such as the BB84 or the
six-state protocol. It turns out that, in these examples,
the maximum is taken if V ← U is the trivial channel
where V is independent of U , i.e., the random variable
V can be omitted.
One method to further reduce the number of param-
eters is to consider the set D2(D1(ΓQBER)), which only
contains normalized two-qubit density operators of the
form
ρ1[λ] = λ1P|Φ+〉 + λ2P|Φ−〉 + λ3P|Ψ+〉 + λ4P|Ψ−〉, (10)
i.e., Eq. (1) for n = 1. As mentioned in Section IIA
(see [18] for details), the state shared by Alice and Bob
is—independently of the considered protocol—measured
with respect to the z-basis. Hence, we obtain for the
QBER Q, computed as an average over the different en-
codings, Q = λ3 + λ4. Apart from that, the state must
be normalized, which implies that, for any given value
of Q, there are at most two free parameters, λ2, and λ3,
i.e., λ1 = 1−Q− λ2, λ4 = Q− λ3.
To prove (9), we will make use of a known result [16]
on the relation between the statistics obtained when ap-
plying two different measurements E and F on the indi-
vidual subsystems of a symmetric n-partite state ρn (cf.
Lemma C.1 in Appendix C). Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be
the outcomes when applying E to each of the first k sub-
systems of ρn, for k ≤ n, and let QZ be the frequency
distribution of the symbols in the string Z, i.e., for any
possible measurement outcome z,
QZ(z) :=
|{i : Zi = z}|
k
.
Similarly, let QZ′ be the frequency distribution of the
outcomes Z′ = (Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
k′) of F applied to k′ of the
remaining n − k subsystems of ρn. Lemma C.1 implies
that, if k and k′ are large enough, then, with probability
almost one, there exists a density operator σ on one sub-
system which is compatible with both of these statistics.
Formally, this means that QZ ≈ PE [σ] and QZ ≈ PF [σ],
where PE [σ] and PF [σ] denote the probability distribu-
tions of the outcomes when measuring σ with respect to
E and F , respectively. Moreover, the state σ is contained
in a certain set B which, roughly speaking, contains all
density operators which correspond to the state of one
single subsystem of ρn, conditioned on any measurement
on the remaining subsystems.
We are now ready to prove expression (9) for the secret-
key rate. As in Section IIA, we consider an extension
of the protocol where, before invoking the classical part
of the QKD protocol, Alice and Bob symmetrize their
strings X and Y. More concretely, they both apply
the same randomly chosen permutation on their strings.
Clearly, this is equivalent to a protocol where Alice and
Bob first permute and then measure their bits (see Sec-
tion IIA). The state ρnAB of Alice and Bob’s system
before the measurement is then symmetric. We can thus
assume without loss of generality that the first npe qubit
pairs are used for the parameter estimation, while the
actual key is generated from the measurement outcomes
obtained from the next ndata pairs.
Consider now some fixed protocol where the pre-
processing is defined by the channels U ← X and V ← U .
We show that this protocol is secure as long as the rate
at which the key is generated is not larger than
rU←X,V←U = inf
σAB∈ΓQBER
(
S(U |V E)−H(U |Y V )) . (11)
In other words, rU←X,V←U is the rate that can be
achieved if the channels U ← X and V ← U are used
for the pre-processing. The assertion (9) then follows by
optimizing over all channels for the pre-processing.
The proof of (11) is subdivided into two parts. In
the first part, we show that the parameter estimation
works correctly, i.e., if the adversary introduces too much
noise, then the protocol aborts. The second part of the
proof is concerned with the security of the classical post-
processing step, that is, if the noise is below a certain
level, then the final key is secure.
For this analysis, we need to consider the state
ρ
npe+ndata
AB of the qubit-pairs used for parameter estima-
tion and classical post-processing. However, in order to
simplify the presentation of the proof, we assume that
there is a small number naux := n − npe − ndata > 0
of additional two-qubit pairs which are not used by the
protocol [37]. In order to get some information about
the structure of the state ρ
npe+ndata
AB , we consider a mea-
surement EBell with respect to the Bell basis applied to
each of the remaining naux positions of ρ
n
AB. We then
analyze the security of our QKD protocol conditioned on
the statistics QW of the outcomes W = (W1, . . . ,Wnaux)
of this measurement. We show that the protocol is secure
for all values of QW, which implies that the protocol is
7secure in general (with probability almost one).
Formally, let PEBell [ΓQBER] be the set of probability
distributions obtained by measuring the states σAB ∈
ΓQBER with respect to the Bell basis. We prove the fol-
lowing two statements:
1. If QW /∈ PEBell [ΓQBER] then the protocol aborts
after the parameter estimation, i.e., no key is gen-
erated.
2. If QW ∈ PEBell [ΓQBER] then the key generated by
the classical post-processing is secure.
To prove statement 1, let F be the measurement that
Alice and Bob apply to each of the npe qubit pairs used
for parameter estimation and let Qpe be the frequency
distribution of the measurement outcomes of F . Since
the state ρnAB is symmetric, we can apply Lemma C.1
described above, where B is defined by the set Γ of
all two-qubit states characterizing the collective attacks
of Eve, as described in Section II B. Hence, there ex-
ists a state σAB ∈ Γ (of a single qubit pair) which is
compatible with both the statistics Qpe and QW, i.e.,
PF [σAB] ≈ Qpe and PEBell [σAB ] ≈ QW. Assume now
that QW /∈ PEBell [ΓQBER]. Because of PEBell [σAB ] ≈ QW,
this implies that σAB /∈ ΓQBER. On the other hand, since
PF [σAB] ≈ Qpe, the statistics Qpe corresponds to the fre-
quency distribution obtained when measuring each of the
npe subsystems of the product state (σAB)
⊗npe with re-
spect to F . Hence, by the definition of the set ΓQBER,
the protocol aborts.
We proceed with the proof of statement 2. For any
frequency distribution Q, let ρndata
AB|QW=Q be the state of
the ndata qubit pairs used for generating the final key,
conditioned on the event that the statistics of the mea-
surement outcomes of the naux auxiliary pairs is equal
to Q. Assume now that Alice and Bob measure their
data bits according to one fixed basis [38], called z-basis,
and, additionally, apply common random bit-flips. Then,
according to the discussion in Section IIA, it is sufficient
to consider states of the form (1). In particular, the con-
ditional state ρndata
AB|QW=Q can be written as
ρndata
AB|QW=Q =
∑
n1,n2,n3,n4
µn1,n2,n3,n4ρn1,n2,n3,n4 (12)
where ρn1,n2,n3,n4 is defined by (2). Hence, if we applied
the Bell measurement EBell to each of the ndata subsys-
tems, then, for any 4-tuple (n1, n2, n3, n4), with prob-
ability µn1,n2,n3,n4 , the resulting frequency distribution
Qdata would be equal to Qn1,n2,n3,n4 := (
n1
n ,
n2
n ,
n3
n ,
n4
n ).
On the other hand, it follows directly from Lemma C.1
(with E = F = EBell) that Qdata ≈ QW holds with proba-
bility almost one. Hence, the coefficients µn1,n2,n3,n4 can
only be non-negligible if Qn1,n2,n3,n4 is close to QW, that
is, we can restrict the sum in (12) to values (n1, n2, n3, n4)
such that Qn1,n2,n3,n4 ≈ Q.
Consider now the product state (σAB)
⊗ndata , where
σAB := ρ
1[Q] is the two-qubit state depending on Q
as defined by (10). Since the state (σAB)
⊗ndata is sym-
metric, we can also write it in the form (12), with
some coefficients µ′n1,n2,n3,n4 . Again, these coefficients
can only be non-negligible if Qn1,n2,n3,n4 is close to Q.
Hence, the states ρndata
AB|QW=Q and (σAB)
⊗ndata have the
same structure (12) where the coefficients µn1,n2,n3,n4
and µ′n1,n2,n3,n4 are negligible except for Qn1,n2,n3,n4 ≈
Q. Using this fact, it is a consequence of the results
presented in Appendix A3 that the smooth Re´nyi en-
tropies of the states derived from ρndata
AB|QW=Q are roughly
equal to the corresponding entropies of the states derived
from (σAB)
⊗ndata . To make this a bit more precise, let
ρndata
UVE|QW=Q be the state obtained when applying the
measurement of Alice followed by the channels U ← X
and V ← U to each of the subsystems of a purification
of ρndata
AB|QW=Q. Then, Lemma A.3 implies that
Sε2(ρ
ndata
UVE|QW=Q) ' ndataS(σUV E)
and
Sε0(ρ
ndata
VE|QW=Q) / ndataS(σV E)
where σUV E is the state obtained from σAB := ρ
1[Q], as
described after (9).
Using these identities, it follows from (7) that the final
key generated by the protocol of the previous section, for
fixed channels U ← X and V ← U , is secure as long as
its length is not larger than
ℓU←X,V←U [σAB ] ≈ ndata
(
S(σUV E)−S(σV E)−H(U |V Y )
)
,
for σAB = ρ
1[Q]. In other words, ℓU←X,V←U [σAB] is
the length of a secure key that can be extracted when
applying the protocol to a state of the form ρndata
AB|QW=Q.
Since the final key must be secure for all possible ini-
tial states for which the protocol does not abort, we have
to take the minimum of this quantity over the states
σAB = ρ
1[Q], for any Q ∈ PEBell [ΓQBER]. Since, accord-
ing to (10), ρ1[Q] is diagonal, the minimum ranges over
all diagonal states σdiagAB whose diagonal elements corre-
spond to Q ∈ PEBell(ΓQBER). This is equivalent to say
that the diagonal elements of σdiagAB are equal to the diag-
onal entries of a density operator σAB ∈ ΓQBER, i.e., the
number ℓ of key bits generated by the protocol is given
by
ℓU←X,V←U := inf
σAB∈ΓQBER
ℓU←X,V←U [σ
diag
AB ] ,
where σdiagAB := D2(σAB). This concludes the proof
of (11) and thus also (9).
IV. AN UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRET-KEY
RATE
As demonstrated in Section III, the rate of a QKD
protocol is lower bounded by an expression which only
8involves von Neumann entropies of states of single qubit
pairs (cf. (9)). In the following, we show that, roughly
speaking, the right hand side of (9) is also an upper
bound on the rate if the supremum is taken over all quan-
tum channels (instead of only classical channels) U ← X
and V ← X .
Clearly, in order to prove upper bounds, it is sufficient
to consider collective attacks. We thus assume that the
overall state ρnABE of Alice’s, Bob’s, and Eve’s quantum
system has product form, i.e., ρnABE = σ
⊗n
ABE , for some
tripartite state σABE . Hence, before starting with the
classical processing, the situation is fully specified by the
n-fold product state σ⊗nXY E , where σXY E is the state ob-
tained when applying Alice’s and Bob’s measurements to
σABE . Similarly to (4), σXY E can be written as
σXY E =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)P|x〉 ⊗ P|y〉 ⊗ σx,yE .
We show that the rate r(σXY E) at which secret key
bits can be generated from this situation, using only a
public communication channel from Alice and Bob, is
upper bounded by
r(σXY E) ≤ sup
σU←X
σV←X
(
S(U |V E))− S(σU|Y V )
)
. (13)
In this formula, the supremum is taken over all density
operators σxU and σ
x
V depending on x. The density op-
erators occurring in the entropies are then given by the
appropriate traces of
σUV Y E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)σ
x
U ⊗ σxV ⊗ P|y〉 ⊗ σxE . (14)
A similar upper bound for the key rate follows from a
result of Devetak and Winter [25]. In contrast to (13),
their formula involves an additional limes over the num-
ber n of product states, whereas the supremum only in-
volves classical channels U ← X and V ← U .
Because of the optimization over the density operators
σxU and σ
x
V , expression (13) is generally hard to evaluate.
To simplify this computation, it is convenient to consider
measurements of Eve, resulting in classical values Z. In
this case, the bound corresponds to a known result due
to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [26],
r(X,Y, Z) = sup
U←X
V←U
(
H(U |V Z))−H(U |Y V )) . (15)
The proof of the upper bound (13) is subdivided into
two parts: First, in Section IVA, we give general condi-
tions on a measure M such that M(σXYE) is an upper
bound on the rate rσXY E . Second, in Section IVB, we
show that the measure M defined by the right hand side
of (13) satisfies these conditions.
A. General properties of upper bounds
LetM be a real-valued function on the set of tripartite
density operators. We show that M(σXYE) is an upper
bound on the rate rσXY E if the following conditions are
satisfied. (Here, we also write M(X ;Y ;E) instead of
M(σXYE). Moreover, if a random variable X
′ is com-
puted from X , we write X ′ ← X .)
1. M(σ⊗nXY E) ≤ nM(σXYE), for any n ∈ N.
2. M(X ′;Y ;E) ≤M(X ;Y ;E) for X ′ ← X .
3. M(X ;Y ′;E) ≤M(X ;Y ;E) for Y ′ ← Y .
4. M(XC;Y C;EC) ≤M(X ;Y ;E) for C ← X .
5. There exists a function α with limε→0 α(ε) = 0 such
that, for any state ρSASBE describing an ε-secure
key pair of length ℓ (cf. (5)),
M(ρSASBE) ≥
(
1− α(ε))ℓ .
Consider an arbitrary secret-key agreement protocol
and assume that the protocol starts with n copies of the
state σXYE . Let ρ
n
SASBE′
be the overall state of Alice’s
and Bob’s key SA and SB, respectively, together with the
adversary’s information E′ after the protocol execution.
Then, using properties 1–4, we find
nM(σXY E) ≥M(σ⊗nXY E) ≥M(ρnSASBE′) . (16)
For any n ∈ N, the resulting state must be ε(n)-close to a
state describing a secret key of length ℓ(n), for ε(n)→ 0
as n approaches infinity. Hence, from (16) and prop-
erty 5,
M(σXYE) ≥ lim
n→∞
ℓ(n)
n
= r(σXY E) ,
which concludes the proof.
B. A concrete expression for the upper bound
Let M be the measure defined by the right hand side
of (13), i.e., for any tripartite density operator σXY E ,
M(σXYE) :=M(X ;Y ;E) is given by
M(X ;Y ;E) := sup
σx
U
,σx
V
(
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y )) .
The goal of this section is to show that this measure
satisfies the conditions of Section IVA, which implies
that M(σXY E) is an upper bound on the secret-key rate
r(σXY E).
Let us start with property 1. It suffices to show that,
for any state σXY EX′Y ′E′ := σXY E ⊗ σX′Y ′E′ ,
M(XX ′;Y Y ′;EE′) ≤M(X ;Y ;E) +M(X ′;Y ′;E′) ,
i.e.,
sup
(U˜,V˜ )←(X,X′)
S(U˜ |V˜ EE′)− S(U˜ |V˜ Y Y ′)
≤ sup
(U,V )←X
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y )
+ sup
(U ′,V ′)←X′
S(U ′|V ′E′)− S(U ′|V ′Y ′) .
9where (U, V ) ← X (and likewise (U ′, V ′) ← X ′ and
(U˜ , V˜ ) ← (X,X ′)) means that the density operators
σxU and σ
x
V used for the definition of σUV E and σUV Y
(cf. (14)) are computed from the classical random vari-
able X . The left hand side of this expression can be
upper bounded by
sup
(U˜,V˜ )←(X,X′)
S(U˜ |V˜ EE′)− S(U˜ |V˜ Y E′)
+ sup
(U˜,V˜ )←(X,X′)
S(U˜ |V˜ Y E′)− S(U˜ |V˜ Y Y ′) .
It thus remains to be shown that for any (U˜ , V˜ ) ←
(X,X ′) there exists (U, V )← X such that
S(U˜ |V˜ EE′)−S(U˜ |V˜ Y E′) ≤ S(U |V E)−S(U |V Y ) (17)
and, similarly, for any (U˜ , V˜ ) ← (X,X ′) there exists
(U ′, V ′)← X ′ such that
S(U˜ |V˜ Y E′)− S(U˜ |V˜ Y Y ′) ≤ S(U ′|V ′E′)− S(U ′|V ′Y ′) .
(18)
Inequality (17) follows from the observation that
(U˜ , V˜ , E′) ← X ← (Y,E) is a Markov chain [39], that
is, we can set U := U˜ and V := (V˜ , E′), in which case
the left hand side and the right hand side of (17) become
identical. Inequality (18) follows similarly from the fact
that (U˜ , V˜ , Y ) ← X ′ ← (Y ′, E′) is a Markov chain, i.e.,
we can set U ′ := U˜ and V ′ := (V˜ , Y ) to obtain equality.
To prove property 2, that is, for any X ′ ← X ,
sup
(U ′,V ′)←X′
S(U ′|V ′E)− S(U ′|V ′Y )
≤ sup
(U,V )←X
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y ) ,
it suffices to show that if (U ′, V ′)← X ′ ← (X,Y,E) is a
Markov chain then (U ′, V ′) ← X ← (Y,E) is a Markov
chain. This is true since X ′ ← X ← (Y,E) is a Markov
chain.
For property 3, we need to show that, for any Y ′ ← Y ,
sup
(U,V )←X
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y ′)
≤ sup
(U,V )←X
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y ) .
This is however a direct consequence of the strong sub-
additivity, implying that
S(U |V Y ′) ≥ S(U |V Y ′Y ) = S(U |V Y ) ,
where the equality is a consequence of the fact that Y ′ ←
Y ← (U, V ) is a Markov chain.
To prove property 4, i.e., for C ← X ,
sup
(U ′,V ′)←(X,C)
S(U ′|V ′EC)− S(U ′|V ′Y C)
≤ sup
(U,V )←X
S(U |V E)− S(U |V Y ) ,
note that (U ′, V ′, C) ← X ← (Y,E) is a Markov chain.
We can thus set U := U ′ and V := (V ′, C), in which case
the left hand side and the right hand side of the above
expression become equal.
It remains to be shown that property 5 holds. Let
σxU := P|x〉 and let σ
x
V be an arbitrary state independent
of x. Then, from Lemma B.2,
M(SA;SB;E) ≥ S(SA|E)− S(SA|SB)
≥ S(SA)−
√
2εℓ− 1/e− S(SA|SB) ,
whereM(SA;SB;E) :=M(ρSASBE). The assertion then
follows from the fact that
I(SA;SB) ≥
(
(1 − ε− 2h(ε)))ℓ .
V. EXAMPLES: THE SIX-STATE, BB84, AND
B92 PROTOCOLS
To compute expression (9) for the secret-key rate, we
have to optimize over the choices of the channels U ← X
and V ← U used for the classical processing. Clearly,
every choice of these channels gives a lower bound on
the rate. Surprisingly, for the QKD protocols considered
below, a good choice is to define U as a noisy version
of X , while V is set to a constant, i.e., it can be dis-
carded. For the protocol, this means that, before doing
error correction, Alice should simply add some noise to
her measurement data. Intuitively, this puts Bob into a
better position than Eve, since the effect of this noise on
the correlation between Alice and Eve is worse than on
those between Alice and Bob.
A. Six-state protocol
The six-state protocol [5] uses three different encod-
ings, defined by the z-basis {|0〉z , |1〉z}, the x-basis
{|0〉x , |1〉x} := {1/
√
2(|0〉z ± |1〉z)}, and the y-basis
{|0〉y , |1〉y} := {1/
√
2(|0〉z± i |1〉z)}. Alice and Bob mea-
sure the QBER for each of these encodings. This gives
three conditions on the diagonal entries λ1, . . . , λ4 (with
respect to the Bell basis) of the states σAB contained
in the set ΓQBER over which we have to minimize (see
equation (9)). In particular, if the QBER equals Q for
all encodings, we get λ3 + λ4 = Q, λ2 + λ4 = Q, and
λ2 + λ3 = Q. Together with the normalization, we im-
mediately find λ1 = 1− 32Q and λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 12Q.
In order to evaluate the entropies occurring in expres-
sion (9), we need to consider a purification |ψ〉ABE of the
diagonalization D2(σAB) of σAB, i.e.,
|ψ〉ABE :=
4∑
i=1
√
λi |Φi〉AB ⊗ |νi〉E ,
where |Φ1〉AB , . . . , |Φ4〉AB denote the Bell states in Alice
and Bob’s joint system (with respect to the z-basis [40])
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and where |ν1〉E , . . . , |ν4〉E are some mutually orthogonal
states in Eve’s system. It is easy to verify that, if Alice
and Bob apply their measurements (with respect to the
z-basis), resulting in outcomes x and y, respectively, the
state of Eve’s system is given by |θx,y〉, where
∣∣θ0,0〉 = 1√
2
(√
λ1 |ν1〉E +
√
λ2 |ν2〉E
)
∣∣θ1,1〉 = 1√
2
(√
λ1 |ν1〉E −
√
λ2 |ν2〉E
)
∣∣θ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(√
λ3 |ν3〉E +
√
λ4 |ν4〉E
)
∣∣θ1,0〉 = 1√
2
(√
λ3 |ν3〉E −
√
λ4 |ν4〉E
)
.
In particular, the density operators σ0E and σ
1
E describing
Eve’s system, if Alice has the value 0 or 1, respectively,
are given by σ0E =
1
2P|θ0,0〉+
1
2P|θ0,1〉 and σ
1
E =
1
2P|θ1,0〉+
1
2P|θ1,1〉. We can write these states with respect to the
basis {|ν0〉E , . . . , |ν3〉E},
σxE =


λ1 ±
√
λ1λ2 0 0
±√λ1λ2 λ2 0 0
0 0 λ3 ±
√
λ3λ4
0 0 ±√λ3λ4 λ4


where ± is a plus sign if x = 0 and a minus sign if x = 1.
As mentioned above, we define U as a noisy ver-
sion of X , with bit-flip probability q, i.e., PU|X=0(1) =
PU|X=1(0) = q. Moreover, V is set to a constant,
which means that it can simply be omitted. Using
the fact that S(UE) = H(U) + S(E|U), and, similarly,
H(UY ) = H(U)+H(Y |U), the entropy difference on the
right hand in the supremum of (9) is given by
S(U |E)−H(U |Y ) = S(E|U)−S(E)−(H(Y |U)−H(Y ))
with
S(E|U) = 12S
(
(1− q)σ0E + qσ1E
)
+ 12S
(
qσ0E + (1− q)σ1E
)
S(E) = S
(
1
2σ
0
E +
1
2σ
1
E
)
.
Furthermore, H(Y ) = 1 and
H(Y |U) = h[q(1−Q) + (1− q)Q] ,
where h is the binary entropy function.
These expressions can easily be evaluated numerically.
For an optimal choice of the parameter q, we get a pos-
itive secret-key rate if Q ≤ 0.141. Without the pre-
processing, we obtain the known bound Q ≤ 0.126 [9]
(see Fig. 1). Remarkably, this bound has already been
improved to Q ≤ 0.127 [9] using degenerate quantum
codes, which can be interpreted as a certain type of pre-
processing.
Another method to obtain conditions on the set ΓQBER
in (9) is to use some additional symmetrization. For
this, we consider the operator D1 as defined by (3) with
✲
Q
new bounds
previous bounds
C.K.
0
14.1 16.3
12.7 16.6
15.7
r > 0 r = 0?
FIG. 1: Lower and upper bounds on the maximally tolerable
QBER Q in percent for the six-state protocol. The last line
(C.K.) indicates the QBER such that I(X;Y ) = I(X;Z) =
I(Y ;Z) where X and Y is Alice’s and Bob’s classical infor-
mation, respectively, and where Z is the classical information
that Eve can gain in an individual attack.
A1 = Vx, A2 = Vy, A3 = Vz and B1 = Vx, B2 = V
†
y , B3 =
Vz, where Vx, Vy, Vz denote the unitary operators trans-
forming the z-basis into the x, y, z-basis, respectively.
This implies that D2(D1(σAB)) = λ1P|Φ+〉 + λ2P|Φ−〉 +
λ3P|Ψ+〉 + λ4P|Ψ−〉, where λ3 + λ4 = 2λ2. As explained
in [18], we can, instead of D2, apply another symmetriza-
tion operation D′2(ρ), e.g.,
D′2(ρ) =
∑
l
O′l ⊗O′l ρ (O′l)† ⊗ (O′l)†, (19)
where O′l ∈ {UV : U ∈ {1l, σz , diag(−i, 1), diag(i, 1)}
andV ∈ {1l, σx}}. Apart from depolarizing any state
to a Bell-diagonal state, this map also equalizes the
coefficients λ3 and λ4 in (10). This implies that
D′2(D1(ΓQBER) = {(1−3Q/2)P|Φ+〉+Q/2(P|Φ−〉+P|Ψ+〉+
P|Ψ−〉)}. Thus, using this method, we find right away all
the necessary conditions on the set ΓQBER.
Finally, we can use (15) to compute an upper bound on
the secret-key rate of the one-way six-state protocol. Let
again
∣∣θ0,0〉 and ∣∣θ1,1〉 be the states of Eve conditioned
on the event that Alice and Bob have the values (0, 0)
and (1, 1), respectively. If the adversary applies a von
Neumann measurement with respect to projectors along
1√
2
(
∣∣θ0,0〉+ ∣∣θ1,1〉) and 1√
2
(
∣∣θ0,0〉− ∣∣θ1,1〉), resulting in Z,
we get r(X,Y, Z) = 0 whenever Q ≥ 0.163.
B. BB84
The BB84 protocol [4] is very similar to the six-state
protocol, but uses only two of the three bases for the
encoding. Hence, one only gets two conditions on the
diagonal entries λ1, . . . , λ4 (with respect to the Bell basis)
of the density operator σAB , namely λ3 + λ4 = Q and
λ2 + λ4 = Q. Hence, the set ΓQBER contains all states
with diagonal entries λ1 = 1 − 2Q + λ4 and λ2 = λ3 =
Q− λ4, for any λ4 ∈ [0, Q].
The evaluation of (9) now follows the same lines as
described above for the six-state protocol. A straight-
forward calculation shows that, independently of the
amount of noise added in the pre-processing, expres-
sion (9) takes its minimum for λ4 = Q
2. When opti-
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FIG. 2: Lower bound on the secret-key rate of the BB84
protocol as a function of the QBER Q. The dashed line rep-
resents the known result [4], whereas the full line shows our
new lower bound. The insert shows the optimal value qopt
for the probability by which Alice has to flip her bits in the
pre-processing phase.
mizing over the preprocessing (i.e., the amount of noise
introduced by Alice) we get a positive rate if Q ≤ 0.124
(see Fig. 2). Note that, without the pre-processing, we
obtain Q ≤ 0.110, which is exactly the bound due to
Shor and Preskill [8]. Computing the upper bound (15)
reproduces the known result saying that the (one-way)
secret-key rate is zero if Q ≥ 0.146 [24].
C. B92
In contrast to the BB84 and the six-state protocol, Al-
ice uses two non-orthogonal states [6]
∣∣ϕ0〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉
and
∣∣ϕ1〉 = α |0〉 − β |1〉 to encode her bit-values 0 and
1, respectively, where α and β are (without loss of gen-
erality) real coefficients with α2 + β2 = 1. Bob ran-
domly applies a measurement with respect to the basis
{
∣∣ϕ0〉 , ∣∣ϕ0〉⊥} or {∣∣ϕ1〉 , ∣∣ϕ1〉⊥}, where |ϕx〉⊥ denotes the
normalized vector orthogonal to |ϕx〉, for x = 0, 1. He
then assigns the bit values 0 and 1 to the measurement
outcomes
∣∣ϕ1〉⊥ and ∣∣ϕ0〉⊥, respectively. In the sifting
step, Alice and Bob discard all bit pairs where Bob mea-
sured |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉.
In order to evaluate expression (9), we will rely on
some of the calculations presented in [16]. We first
need a description of Alice and Bob’s data bits after
the sifting step. Note that, in contrast to the BB84
or the six-state protocol, the sifting only depends on
the measurement outcomes of Bob. Therefore, we con-
sider the state obtained from the operation 1lA⊗B, with
B := |0〉 〈ϕ1∣∣⊥ + |1〉 〈ϕ0∣∣⊥, applied to each of the qubit
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FIG. 3: Lower bound on the secret-key rate of the B92 pro-
tocol, for α = 0.38 (see text for an explanation of the param-
eter δ). The dashed line represents the known result without
pre-processing [16], whereas the solid line is our new lower
bound on the rate when Alice additionally adds noise qopt to
her measurement data.
pairs. Note that this corresponds to the application of the
map D1 (see (3)). ΓQBER is then defined as the set of all
states σAB which can result from this operation (applied
to any two-qubit density operator which corresponds to a
collective attack of Eve) and, in addition, are compatible
with the QBER. In [16], explicit conditions on the diago-
nal entries (with respect to the Bell basis) of these states
have been computed. In particular, the first two diagonal
entries are λ1 = (1−Q)1+s2 and λ2 = (1−Q)1−s2 where s
is the scalar product between the states of the adversary,
conditioned on the event that Alice and Bob have the val-
ues (0, 0) and (1, 1), respectively. This characterization
is already sufficient to obtain reasonable lower bounds on
the rate (9).
Similarly to the previous examples, adding noise on
Alice’s side turns out to be useful. The results of our
computations are summarized in Fig. 3, parameterized
by the noise δ of a corresponding depolarizing channel
ρ 7→ (1 − 2δ)ρ + δ1l [41]. The rate is positive as long as
δ ≤ 0.0278 (compared to δ / 0.0240 without noise [11,
16]). Within the region shown in the figure, the relation
between the parameter δ and the QBER is Q ≈ 2δ [42].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have analyzed a general class of QKD protocols
with one-way classical post-processing, thereby using a
technique which is not based on entanglement purifica-
tion. We have shown that, in order to guarantee security
against the most general attacks, it is sufficient to con-
sider collective attacks. Moreover, we have derived a new
general lower bound on the secret-key rate (formula (9))
which is very similar to the well-known expression for
the classical one-way secret-key rate due to Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [26]. While the latter applies if the information of
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the adversary is purely classical (i.e., if she is restricted
to individual attacks), expression (9) can be seen as a
quantum version of it.
In order to evaluate (9), one only needs to optimize
over a certain set of two-qubit density operators, which
is characterized by the possible collective attacks on the
specific protocol. We have illustrated this for some of
the most popular QKD schemes, namely the BB84, the
six-state, and the B92-protocol, with one-way classical
post-processing, say, from Alice to Bob. Surprisingly, our
results imply that the performance of these protocols can
be increased if Alice introduces noise to her measurement
data. In particular, we get new lower bounds on the
maximum tolerated channel noise which are between 10
and 15 percent larger than the previously known ones.
While our method allows to exactly analyze the se-
curity of a general class of QKD protocols with one-way
post-processing, it is still an open problem to identify the
protocols which achieve the maximum rate. In particu-
lar, we do not know whether a bit-wise pre-processing
is optimal, or whether it might be more advantageous
for Alice and Bob to process larger blocks. Note, how-
ever, that the upper bound (13) on the secret-key rate of
one-way protocols essentially has the same form as the
lower bound (9), but involves a maximization over cer-
tain quantum states instead of only classical random vari-
ables. The question of whether bit-wise pre-processing is
optimal thus reduces to the problem of proving that these
two expressions are equal.
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APPENDIX A: SMOOTH RE´NYI ENTROPY
1. Basic properties
Smooth Re´nyi entropy has been introduced in [19] in
order to characterize fundamental properties of classical
random variables. For instance, the ε-smooth Re´nyi en-
tropy of order 0 of a random variable X conditioned on
Y , denoted Hε0(X |Y ), measures the minimum length of
an encoding C of X such that X can be reconstructed
from C and Y , except with probability roughly ε. Sim-
ilarly, the ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy of order 2, denoted
Hε2(X |Y ), quantifies the amount of uniform randomness
independent of Y that can be extracted from X (with
probability roughly 1− ε).
In [15], the notion of smooth Re´nyi entropy has been
generalized to quantum states. For a density operator
ρ, we denote by Sεα(ρ), the ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy of
order α of ρ. Similar to the von Neumann entropy, Sεα(ρ)
is defined as the (classical) smooth Re´nyi entropy of the
eigenvalues of ρ, interpreted as a probability distribution.
We also write Sεα(UV ) instead of S
ε
α(ρUV ) and, similarly,
Sεα(U) instead of S
ε
α(ρU ), where ρU is the partial state
ρU := trV (ρUV ).
We start reviewing some basic properties of smooth
Re´nyi entropy of quantum states. The proofs can be
found in [19] and [15]. Most of these properties are very
analogous to the properties of the von Neumann entropy
S(·). For instance, if ρUV is a state on HU ⊗ HV , then
the difference between Sεα(UV ) and S
ε
α(U) is bounded by
the entropy of V , which corresponds to the well known
fact that S(U) − S(V ) ≤ S(UV ) ≤ S(U) + S(V ): For
α = 2, we have
Sε2(UV ) ≤ Sε+ε
′
2 (U) + S
ε′
0 (V ) (A1)
Sε+ε
′
2 (UV ) ≥ Sε2(U)− Sε
′
0 (V ) (A2)
and, similarly, for α = 0,
Sε+ε
′
0 (UV ) ≤ Sε0(U) + Sε
′
0 (V ) (A3)
Sε0(UV ) ≥ Sε+ε
′
0 (U)− Sε
′
0 (V ) . (A4)
Consider now a bipartite state ρUZ on HU ⊗ HZ where
the second part is purely classical, i.e.,
ρUZ =
∑
z
PZ(z) ρ
z
U ⊗ P|z〉 ,
for some probability distribution PZ and a family of
orthonormal vectors {|z〉}z on HZ . Then, the smooth
Re´nyi entropy cannot increase when conditioning on Z,
that is,
Sεα(U |Z) ≤ Sεα(U) , (A5)
for α = 0 and α = 2. The following inequalities can
be interpreted as extensions of the chain rule S(UZ) =
S(U |Z) + S(Z) to smooth Re´nyi entropy:
Sε2(U |Z) ≤ Sε+ε
′
2 (UZ)−Hε
′
2 (Z) (A6)
Sε+ε
′+ε′′
2 (U |Z) > Sε
′
2 (UZ)−Hε
′′
0 (Z)− 2 log(1/ε) (A7)
Sε0(U |Z) ≥ Sε+ε
′
0 (UZ)−Hε
′
0 (Z) (A8)
Sε+ε
′+ε′′
0 (U |Z) < Sε
′
0 (UZ)−Hε
′′
2 (Z) + 2 log(1/ε) .
(A9)
More generally, let ρUZV be a density operator on HU ⊗
HZ⊗HV such that the states onHU andHV only depend
on the classical subsystem HZ , i.e., there exist density
operators ρzU and ρ
z
V on HU and HV , respectively, such
that
ρUV Z =
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)ρ
z
U ⊗ ρzV ⊗ P|z〉 ,
where PZ is a probability distribution and {|z〉}z∈Z a
family of orthonormal vectors on HZ . Then
Sε+ε
′
2 (UV Z) ≥ Sε2(U |Z) + Sε
′
2 (V Z) (A10)
Sε+ε
′
0 (UV Z) ≤ Sε0(U |Z) + Sε
′
0 (V Z) . (A11)
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The following identities are useful to determine the
conditional smooth Re´nyi entropy Sεα(U |Z) if the smooth
Re´nyi entropy Sεα(U |Z = z), conditioned on certain val-
ues z, is known. For any z ∈ Z, let εz := ε · PZ(z).
Then
Sεz2 (U |Z) ≤ Sε2(U |Z = z) (A12)
Sεz0 (U |Z) ≥ Sε0(U |Z = z) . (A13)
Additionally, for any set Z¯ ⊂ Z such that Prz[z ∈ Z¯] ≥
1− ε,
Sε+ε
′
2 (U |Z) ≥ min
z∈Z¯
Sε
′
2 (U |Z = z) (A14)
Sε+ε
′
0 (U |Z) ≤ max
z∈Z¯
Sε
′
0 (U |Z = z) . (A15)
Similarly to the von Neumann entropy, the smooth
Re´nyi entropy can only increase when applying a unital
quantum operation E [43], that is,
Sεα(E(ρU )) ≥ Sεα(ρU ) . (A16)
for any α ∈ R+ and ε ∈ R+.
The smooth Re´nyi entropies of order α are related for
different values of α. In particular, we have
Sε2(U) / S
ε
0(U) , (A17)
where the approximation holds up to O(ε). Finally, the
smooth Re´nyi entropy of an n-fold product state ρ⊗n
approaches the von Neumann entropy. Formally, for any
α ∈ R+ and ε ∈ R+,∣∣Sεα(ρ⊗n)− nS(ρ)∣∣ ≤ O(log(1/ε)) . (A18)
2. Smooth Re´nyi entropy and measurements
Let E be a measurement defined by a family of oper-
ators {Ez}z∈Z . Let ρU˜ := E(ρU ) =
∑
z EzρUE
†
z be the
state of the quantum system after applying E to a den-
sity operator ρU , and let Z be the classical measurement
outcome, i.e., PZ(z) := tr(EzρUE
†
z), for z ∈ Z. We have
seen in the previous section (see (A16)) that the entropy
Sεα(U˜) of ρU˜ can only be larger than the entropy S
ε
α(U)
of ρU if E is unital. The following lemma states that the
maximum increase of the smooth Re´nyi entropy when ap-
plying E is bounded by the entropyHε0(Z) of the classical
measurement outcome Z.
Lemma A.1. Let ρU˜ be the state obtained when applying
the trace-preserving measurement E to ρU and let Z be
the classical outcome. Then, for ε, ε′ ∈ R+,
Sε2(U˜) ≤ Sε+ε
′
2 (U) +H
ε′
0 (Z) (A19)
Sε+ε
′
0 (U˜) ≤ Sε0(U) +Hε
′
0 (Z) . (A20)
Proof. Let T be the linear operation fromHU toHU˜⊗HZ
defined by
T : |ϕ〉 7−→
∑
z∈Z
(Ez |ϕ〉)⊗ |z〉 ,
for any |ϕ〉 ∈ HU , where {|z〉}z is a family of orthonor-
mal vectors in HZ . Let ρ′U˜Z := TρUT †. It is easy to
verify that ρU˜ = trZ(ρ
′
U˜Z
), and that the eigenvalues of
ρ′Z correspond to the probabilities PZ(z). Hence, since
the smooth Re´nyi entropy of quantum states is defined
by the classical smooth Re´nyi entropy of its eigenvalues,
we have Sε
′
α (ρ
′
Z) = H
ε′
α (Z). Moreover, because E is trace-
preserving, i.e.,
∑
z∈Z E
†
zEz = 1lU , we have T
†T = 1lU .
Consequently, ρ′
U˜Z
has the same eigenvalues as ρU , i.e.,
Sεα(ρ
′
U˜Z
) = Sεα(ρU ). Hence, using (A2), we find
Sε2(ρU˜ ) = S
ε
2(trZ(ρ
′
U˜Z
)) ≤ Sε+ε′2 (ρ′U˜Z) + Sε
′
0 (ρ
′
Z)
= Sε+ε
′
2 (ρU ) +H
ε′
0 (Z) ,
which concludes the proof of (A19). Inequality (A20)
follows by the same argument, where (A2) is replaced
by (A4).
A similar relation holds between the smooth Re´nyi en-
tropy Sεα(U) of the original quantum state ρU and the
entropy Sεα(U˜ |Z) of the state ρU˜ after the measurement,
conditioned on the classical outcome Z. Lemma A.2 be-
low states that the difference between these entropies is
roughly bounded by the entropy Hε0(Z) of Z.
Lemma A.2. Let ρU˜ be the state obtained when apply-
ing a von Neumann measurement E to a state ρU . Let
Sεα(U˜ |Z) be the entropy of ρU˜ , conditioned on the classi-
cal outcome Z. Then, for ε, ε′, ε′′ ∈ R+,
Sε+ε
′
2 (U) ≥ Sε2(U˜ |Z)−Hε
′
0 (Z) (A21)
Sε2(U) < S
ε+ε′+ε′′
2 (U˜ |Z) +Hε
′
0 (Z) + 2 log(1/ε
′′)
(A22)
and
Sε+ε
′
0 (U) ≤ Sε0(U˜ |Z) +Hε
′
0 (Z) (A23)
Sε0(U) ≥ Sε+ε
′
0 (U˜ |Z)−Hε
′
0 (Z) . (A24)
Proof. Let Ez be the projectors defined by the measure-
ment E and let ρU˜Z be the state as defined in the proof
of Lemma A.1. Since, by assumption, the ranges of the
operators Ez, for z ∈ Z, are mutually orthogonal, the
states ρU˜Z and ρU˜ have the same eigenvalues and thus
S ε¯α(U˜Z) = S
ε¯
α(U˜). Using this identity, (A21) follows
from (A19) and (A5),
Sε+ε
′
2 (U) ≥ Sε2(U˜)−Hε
′
0 (Z) ≥ Sε2(U˜ |Z)−Hε
′
0 (Z) .
Similarly, (A22) follows from (A16) and (A7),
Sε2(U) ≤ Sε2(U˜) = Sε2(U˜Z)
< Sε+ε
′+ε′′
2 (U˜ |Z) +Hε
′
0 (Z) + 2 log(1/ε
′′) .
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To prove (A23), we use (A16) and (A8),
Sε+ε
′
0 (U) ≤ Sε+ε
′
0 (U˜) = S
ε+ε′
0 (U˜Z)
≤ Sε0(U˜ |Z) +Hε
′
0 (Z) .
Finally, (A24) follows from (A20) and (A5),
Sε0(U) ≥ Sε+ε
′
0 (U˜)−Hε
′
0 (Z) ≥ Sε+ε
′
0 (U˜ |Z)−Hε
′
0 (Z) .
3. The smooth Re´nyi entropy of symmetric states
The goal of this section is to derive an expression for
the smooth Re´nyi entropies of a symmetric state over n
subsystems in terms of the von Neumann entropy of a
corresponding state over only one subsystem.
Let σ1, . . . , σd be density operators on HU and let ρnU
be the symmetric state over H⊗nU defined by
ρnU := Pn
( ∑
n∈Γn
d
µn σ
⊗n1
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ⊗ndd
)
(A25)
where, for any n ∈ Γnd := {(n1, . . . , nd) :
∑
i ni = n}, µn
are nonnegative coefficients such that
∑
n µn = 1.
Similarly, for any d-tuple λ = (λ1, . . . λd) over R
+, let
σU [λ] be the density operator on HU defined by
σU [λ] :=
∑
i
λiσi . (A26)
Let E be a quantum operation from HU to HV . The
following lemma gives a relation between the smooth
Re´nyi entropy of the symmetric state obtained by ap-
plying E to each of the subsystems of a purification of ρnU
and the von Neumann entropy of the state obtained by
applying E to a purification of σU [λ].
Lemma A.3. Let ρnUW be a purification of the state ρ
n
U
defined by (A25) with coefficients µn and let ρ
n
VW :=
(E ⊗ 1lW )⊗n(ρnUW). Similarly, for any d-tuple λ, let
σUW [λ] be a purification of the state σU [λ] defined
by (A26) and let σVW [λ] := (E ⊗ 1lW )(σUW [λ]). Let Γ¯
be a subset of Γnd such that
∑
n∈Γ¯ µn ≥ 1− ε2 . Then
Sε2(ρ
n
VW) ' nmin
λ
S(σVW[λ])
Sε0(ρ
n
VW) / nmax
λ
S(σVW[λ])
where the minimum and maximum are taken over all λ =
(λ1, . . . , λd) such that n(λ1, . . . , λd) ∈ Γ¯, and where the
approximation is up to O(d log(n) + log(n/ε)).
The proof of Lemma A.3 is based on the fact that there
exists a measurement on σU [λ]
⊗n such that the resulting
state, conditioned on a certain measurement outcome, is
equal to the state ρnU. The assertion then follows from
the observation that this measurement does only change
the entropies by a small constant.
We start with the proof of a restricted version of the
statement, formulated as Lemma A.4 below, which holds
for states of the form (A25) where only one of the weights
µn is nonzero. Let |ϕ1〉 , . . . , |ϕd〉 ∈ HU⊗HW be purifica-
tions of the states σ1, . . . , σd, respectively, such that the
partial traces trU (P|ϕi〉) are mutually orthogonal. For
n = (n1, . . . , nd) ∈ Γnd , let
|ψ〉nUW :=
1√
|Sn|
∑
π∈Sn
π
(|ϕ1〉⊗n1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕd〉⊗nd) ,
(A27)
where Sn denotes the set of all permutations π on n-
tuples. Similarly, for λ = (λ1, . . . , λd), let
|ϕ〉λUW :=
d∑
i=1
√
λi |ϕi〉 . (A28)
Lemma A.4. Let ρnUW[n] := P|ψ〉nUW be the pure state
defined by (A27), for some fixed n = (n1, . . . , nd) ∈ Γnd ,
and let ρnVW[n] := (E ⊗ 1lW )⊗n(ρnUW[n]). Moreover, for
λ := (n1n , . . . ,
nd
n ), let σUW [λ] := P|ϕ〉λUW be the pure state
defined by (A28) and let σVW [λ] := (E ⊗ 1l)(σUW [λ]).
Then, for α ∈ {0, 2},∣∣Sεα(ρnVW[n])− nS(σVW [λ])∣∣ ≤ O(log(n/ε)) .
Proof. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, let Pi be the projector onto
the support of (E ⊗ 1lW )(P|ϕi〉), which, by the definition
of the vectors |ϕi〉, are orthogonal for distinct i. Addi-
tionally, let F : ρ 7→ F0ρF †0 +F1ρF †1 be the measurement
on H⊗nV defined by
F0 :=
∑
π∈Sn
π(P⊗n11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P⊗ndd )
and F1 := 1l− F0. We first show that
ρnVW[n] =
1
N
F0
(
σVW [λ]
⊗n)F †0 , (A29)
where N := |Sn|
∏d
i=1 λ
ni
i .
Let (E ⊗ 1lW )(ρ) =
∑m
α=1 E¯αρE¯
†
α be the operator-
sum representation of E ⊗ 1lW . Moreover, for any α¯ :=
(α1, . . . , αn), let E¯α¯ := E¯α1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ E¯αn . The above
equality can then be rewritten as
∑
α¯
E¯α¯(ρ
n
UW[n])E¯
†
α¯ =
1
N
∑
α¯
F0E¯α¯(σUW [λ]
⊗n)E¯†α¯F
†
0 .
It suffices to verify that equality holds for any term in
the sum, i.e.,
E¯α¯ |ψ〉nUW =
1√
N
F0E¯α¯ |ϕ〉⊗nUW , (A30)
for any n-tuple α¯ = (α1, . . . , αn) on {1, . . . ,m}. Because
of the definition of the projectors Pi, we have PiE¯α |ϕj〉 =
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E¯α |ϕj〉, if i = j, and PiE¯α |ϕj〉 = 0 otherwise. Hence,
for any |ϕi1,...,in〉 := |ϕi1 〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕin〉,
F0E¯α¯ |ϕi1,...,in〉 =
{
E¯α¯ |ϕi1,...,in〉 if |ϕi1,...,in〉 ∈ Θn
0 otherwise,
where Θn := {π(|ϕ1〉n1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕd〉nd) : π ∈ Sn}. This
implies (A30) and thus (A29).
Let ρn
V˜W˜
be the state of the system after applying the
measurement F to σVW [λ]⊗n, and let Z be the classi-
cal measurement outcome. In the following, we write
Sεα(V˜W˜|Z = 0) to denote the entropy of ρnV˜W˜ condi-
tioned on Z = 0. Then, according to (A29),
Sεα(ρ
n
VW[n]) = S
ε
α(V˜W˜|Z = 0) . (A31)
Let ε′ := 12PZ(0)ε where PZ(0) = tr(F0(σ
⊗n
VW )F
†
0 ). Us-
ing (A12) and (A22), we find
Sε2(V˜W˜|Z = 0) ≥ S2ε
′
2 (V˜W˜|Z)
> Sε
′
2 (σVW [λ]
⊗n)− 1− 2 log(1/ε′) .
Similarly, using (A13) and (A24),
Sε0(V˜W˜|Z = 0) ≤ S2ε
′
0 (V˜W˜
n|Z)
≤ S2ε′0 (σVW [λ]⊗n) + 1 .
Hence, because the smooth Re´nyi entropy of order 0
is larger than the smooth Re´nyi entropy of order 2
(cf. (A17)), we have
Sε
′
2 (σ
⊗n
VW ) / S
ε
2(V˜W˜|Z = 0)
/ Sε0(V˜W˜|Z = 0) / S2ε
′
0 (σ
⊗n
V W )
where the approximation holds up to O(log(1/ε′)). Com-
bining this with (A31), we conclude
Sε
′
2 (σ
⊗n
VW ) / S
ε
α(ρ
n
VW[n]) / S
2ε′
0 (σ
⊗n
V W ) .
The assertion then follows from the observation that
PZ(0) ≥ 1n , which implies ε′ ≥ ε2n , and the fact that the
smooth Re´nyi entropy of product states approaches the
von Neumann entropy (see (A18)).
Proof of Lemma A.3. It is easy to see that it suffices to
prove the assertion for one specific purification of the
states ρnU and σU . Let thus |ϕ1〉 , . . . , |ϕd〉 ∈ HU ⊗ HW
be the purifications of σ1, . . . , σd defined above. More-
over, for any n ∈ Γnd , let ρnUW [n] := P|ψ〉nUW be the state
defined by (A27) and let ρnUW := P|ψ〉 where
|ψ〉 :=
∑
n∈Γ
√
µn |ψ〉nUV .
Similarly, for any λ = (λ1, . . . , λd), let σUW [λ] := P|ϕ〉λ
UW
be the state defined by (A28). It follows from these def-
initions that ρnUW is a purification of ρ
n
U and, similarly,
σUW [λ] is a purification of ρU [λ].
For any n ∈ Γnd , let HnW be the smallest subspace
of H⊗nW containing the support of the traces ρnW[n] =
trH⊗n
U
(ρnUW[n]). By the definition of the vectors |ϕi〉,
the subspaces HnW are orthogonal for distinct n ∈ Γnd .
Hence, there exists a projective measurement F onto the
subspaces HU ⊗HnW . Consider the state ρV˜W˜ obtained
when applying F to ρnVW, and let Z be the classical out-
come, i.e., Z takes values from the set Γnd . The entropy
Sεα(V˜
nW˜n|Z = n) of the state ρn
V˜W˜
after the measure-
ment, conditioned on Z = n, is equal to the entropy of
ρnVW[n] as defined by Lemma A.4, i.e.,
Sεα(V˜W˜|Z = n) = Sεα(ρnVW[n]) .
Hence, from (A21) and (A14),
Sε2(ρ
n
VW) ≥ Sε2(V˜W˜|Z)−H0(Z)
≥ min
n∈Γ¯
S
ε/2
2 (V˜W˜|Z = n)−H0(Z)
= min
n∈Γ¯
S
ε/2
2 (ρ
n
VW[n])−H0(Z) .
and, similarly, from (A23) and (A15),
Sε0(ρ
n
VW) ≤ Sε0(V˜W˜|Z) +H0(Z)
≤ max
n∈Γ¯
S
ε/2
0 (ρ
n
VW[n]) +H0(Z) .
Finally, from Lemma A.4,∣∣Sε/2α (ρnVW[n])− nSα(σVW [λ])∣∣ ≤ O(log(2n/ε))
where λ = (n1n , . . . ,
nd
n ). The assertion then follows from
the observation that H0(Z) ≤ log2(|Γnd |) ≤ d log2(n).
APPENDIX B: ENTROPY OF ALMOST
PRODUCT STATES
Let X be a classical random variable and let ρxB be
a quantum state depending on X . Clearly, if the states
ρxB are equal for all x, then the entropy of X does not
change when conditioning on the quantum system, i.e.,
S(X) = S(X |B). In this section, we show that, if the
joint state describing X and ρxB is close to a product
state, then the entropy change of X when conditioning
on the quantum system is still small (cf. Lemma B.2).
We first need a lemma relating the trace distance of two
density operators to the trace distance of purifications of
them.
Lemma B.1. Let ρ and ρ′ be density operators and let
|ψ〉 be a purification of ρ. Then there exists a purification
|ψ′〉 of ρ′ such that
δ(P|ψ〉, P|ψ′〉) ≤
√
2δ(ρ, ρ′) .
Proof. Note that the fidelity F is related to the trace
distance δ according to
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 .
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Moreover, Uhlmann’s theorem states that there exists a
purification |ψ′〉 of ρ′ such that
F (ρ, ρ′) = F (P|ψ〉, P|ψ′〉) .
Hence,
δ(P|ψ〉, P|ψ′〉) ≤
√
1− F (P|ψ〉, P|ψ′〉)2
=
√
1− F (ρ, ρ′)2
≤
√
2(1− F (ρ, ρ′))
≤
√
2δ(ρ, ρ′) .
Lemma B.2. Let ρXB be a bipartite density operator of
the form
ρXB =
d∑
x=1
µxP|x〉 ⊗ ρxB ,
where {|x〉}x∈{1,...,d} is an orthonormal basis of the first
subsystem. If
δ(ρXB, ρX ⊗ ρB) ≤ ε ,
then
S(X |B) ≥ S(X)−
√
2ε log(d) − 1/e .
Proof. It is easy to see that the trace distance between
ρXB and ρX ⊗ ρB can be written as
δ(ρXB, ρX ⊗ ρB) =
∑
x
µx
(
δ(ρxB , ρB)
)
.
Let ψ be a purification of ρB. According to Lemma B.1,
for all x ∈ {1, . . . , d}, there exists a purification |ψx〉 of
ρxB such that
δ(P|ψx〉, P|ψ〉) ≤
√
2δ(ρxB, ρB) .
Hence, using Jensen’s inequality,
∑
x
µx
(
δ(P|ψx〉, P|ψ〉)
) ≤√2∑
x
µx
(
δ(ρxB, ρB)
) ≤ √2ε .
Let now ρXBB′ be the state defined by
ρXBB′ :=
∑
x
µx
(
P|x〉 ⊗ P|ψx〉
)
.
Note that, by this definition, ρXB = trB′(ρXBB′).
From the strong subadditivity, we have
S(X |B) ≥ S(X |BB′)
= S(XBB′)− S(BB′) ≥ S(X)− S(BB′)
where the last inequality holds since
S(BB′|X) =
∑
x
µxS(ρ
BB′
x ) ≥ 0 .
Because the rank of ρBB′ is not larger than d, S(BB
′)
can be bounded using Fannes’ inequality, i.e.,
S(ρBB′) ≤ S(P|ψ〉) + δ(ρBB′ , P|ψ〉) log(d) + 1/e . (B1)
Since ρBB′ =
∑
x µx(P|ψx〉), it follows from the convexity
of the trace distance that
δ(ρBB′ , P|ψ〉) ≤
∑
x
µx
(
δ(P|ψx〉, P|ψ〉)
) ≤ √2ε .
Inserting this into (B1) and observing that S(P|ψ〉) = 0
concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C: KNOWN RESULTS
Consider two different measurement operations E and
F applied to the individual parts of a symmetric state ρn.
Lemma C.1 gives a relation between the measurement
statistics of E and F (see [16] for a proof).
Lemma C.1. Let ρn be a symmetric quantum state on
H⊗n, and let E and F be POVMs on H with |E| and |F|
POVM elements, respectively. Let QX and QY be the
frequency distribution of the outcomes when applying the
measurements E⊗k and F⊗n−k, respectively, to different
subsystems of ρn. Finally, let B be any convex set of
density operators such that, for any operator A on n− 1
subsystems, the normalization of trn−1(1l ⊗ Aρn1l ⊗ A†)
is contained in B. Then, for any ε > 0, with probability
at least 1− 2|E|+|F|e−nε28 , there exists a state σ ∈ B such
that
k
n
δ
(
QX, PE [σ]
)
+
n− k
n
δ
(
QY, PF [σ]
) ≤ ε ,
where PE [σ] and PF [σ] denote the probability distribu-
tions of the outcomes when measuring σ with respect to
E and F , respectively.
Lemma C.2 below provides an expression for the max-
imum length of a key S that can be generated from a
string Z such that S is secure against an adversary hold-
ing a quantum state ρzE depending on Z. The proof can
be found in [15] (see also [14]). Note that Lemma C.2
holds with respect to a so-called universally composable
security definition. This implies that the final key S can
be used in any context where a perfect key (i.e., a uni-
formly distributed key which is completely independent
of the adversary’s knowledge) is secure.
Lemma C.2. Let ρZE be a density operator such that ρZ
is classical, i.e., ρZE =
∑
z PZ(z)P|z〉⊗ ρzE, where {|z〉}z
is a family of orthonormal vectors, and let ε ∈ R+. Let
S be the key computed by applying a two-universal hash
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function F mapping the value of Z to a value in {0, 1}ℓ.
Then S is ε-secure with respect to ρEF if
ℓ ≤ Sε′2 (ZE)− Sε
′
0 (E)− 2 log(1/ε) ,
where ε′ = (ε/8)2.
The following lemma on error correction is a direct con-
sequence of Lemma 4 from [27] (see also [19]). Roughly
speaking, it states that a message of length Hε0(X |Y ) is
sufficient to guess the value of X when only Y is known.
Lemma C.3. Let X and Y be sets, let ε ∈ R+, and
let m ∈ N. Then there exists a probabilistic encod-
ing function e : X × R → C, taking randomness with
some distribution PR such that the following holds: For
all probability distributions PXY on X × Y satisfying
Hε
′
0 (X |Y ) + log(1/ε′) ≤ m, for ε′ = ε/2, there exists a
decoding function d : C×Y → X such that the probability
of a decoding error is smaller than ε, i.e.,
Pr
(x,y,r)←PXY×PR
[
d(e(x, r), y) = x
] ≥ 1− ε
and the encoding C := e(X,R) gives no more than m bits
of information on X, i.e.,
H0(C) −H∞(C|X) ≤ m .
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